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This paper conducts an empirical analysis of risk premiums in the German day-ahead 
Electricity Wholesale Market. We compare hourly price data of the European Energy 
Exchange (EEX) auction and of the continuous over-the-counter (OTC) market taking place 
prior to EEX. As OTC price data are not publicly available, data provided by the Energy 
Exchange Austria (EXAA) have been used as a snapshot of the OTC market. It has been 
found that market participants are willing to pay both, positive and negative premiums for 
hourly contracts that are significantly different from zero. The largest positive premiums were 
paid for evening peak hours on weekdays during winter months, the period of time with the 
highest electricity consumption levels of the year. By contrast, night hours on weekends 
featuring lowest demand levels display negative premiums. Hence, findings by Longstaff and 
Wang (2004) can be supported that power traders in liberalised markets behave like risk-
averse rational economic agents.  
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Within  the  last  decade,  the  German  and  other  European  Power  Markets  underwent 
unprecedented  transformations.  Directives  and  regulations  issued  by  the  European 
Commission aimed to open markets, ensure non-discriminatory third-party access to power 
grids (Directive 2003/54/EC repealing Directive 96/92/EC) and to enforce cross border 
trading activities (Regulation 1228/2003) in order to harmonise prices and mitigate market 
power of national incumbent operators. An overview of the main regulatory issues related 
to  European  Electricity  Markets  and  their  recent  progress  was  compiled  in  the  “DG 
Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry” by the European Commission (2007). The 
report  focuses  on  concentration,  market  power,  vertical  integration,  market  integration, 
transparency and price issues and it states that some progress has been made but many 
barriers to free competition still persist
1. 
 
However,  without  any  doubt  the  process  of  liberalisation  led  to  an  increase  in  power 
trading activities across Europe - particularly in Germany - Europe’s largest economy and 
Power Market in terms of electricity consumption. Germany’s annual power consumption 
amounts  to  500-550 TWh.  According  to  a  recently  published  review  of  EU  Wholesale 
Energy Markets by Rademaekers et al (2008), estimated total annual trading turnover of 
German power contracts grew from 2,400 TWh in 2006 to 3,200 TWh in 2007. The fact 
that total trading turnover in 2007 amounted to around 6 times consumption can be seen as 
a sign of market maturity. 
 
Nevertheless policymakers, regulators and public opinion in Europe remain suspicious of 
power trading activities. This is partly due to the complexity of electricity trading and a 
lack of market transparency. As a result, the European Commission is currently addressing 
the issue to find which transparency requirements on trading activities are necessary to 
ensure  a  positive  development  of  European  Power  Markets  in  accordance  with  the 
Directives  and  Regulations  mentioned  above  (Rademaekers  et  al,  2008).  As  exchange 
based trading covers only a small fraction of the overall trading activities in most European 
countries,  improved  transparency  in  terms  of  market  participants,  traded  volumes  and 
prices of the OTC market would be beneficial for regulators and policymakers in order to 
asses and monitor the functioning of European Power Markets. 
 
Within this context, this paper conducts an empirical analysis of prices and premiums paid 
on  the  German  day-ahead  Power  Market  and  aims  to  improve  transparency  and 
understanding of this market.  In order to  compare day-ahead EEX  auction prices with 
                                                 
1 For additional interpretation of the DG competition report, see London Economics (2007) and Ockenfels 
(2007) 2 
 
prices of the preceding continuous day-ahead OTC trading which are not publicly available 
yet, we decided to use price data provided by the Energy Exchange Austria (EXAA) as a 
snapshot of the continuous OTC market
2. We find that positive and negative premiums for 
hourly contracts were paid only two hours prior to the final EEX auction. The average 
premium  of  daily  delivery  contracts  represented  by  the  Base  block  contract  is  slightly 
positive (0.61 €/MWh), but not statistically different from zero. 
 
Premiums  paid  in  electricity  forward  markets  differ  from  those  paid  in  markets  for 
financial assets or storable commodities. This is due to the physical property of power – it 
is not storable. While the constraint of non-negativity on inventory distinguishes financial 
assets  from  storable  commodities,  power  markets  are  characterised  by  the  absence  of 
storage capacities in meaningful quantities at competitive cost. Therefore, power prices 
usually  feature  unique  properties  such  as  price  spikes  and  heteroscedasticity
3.  For  this 
reason, equilibrium models for commodities as described by Fama and French (1987) or 
Routledge et al (2000) cannot be applied to electricity markets.  
 
Few authors such as Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002), Benth et al (2008) or Pirrong and 
Jermakyan (2008) focus particularly on modeling equilibrium prices of forward contracts 
and risk premiums in electricity wholesale markets. Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) 
present an equilibrium model that explicitly takes into account the physical properties of 
power and the convexity of the power production cost curve. According to their model, 
there are negative risk premiums for off-peak hours caused by low demand, little skewness 
and risk averse sellers. In peak hours however, buyers are willing to pay positive risk 
premiums  due  to  the  high  demand  and  highly  right  skewed  power  prices.  Benth  et  al 
(2008) also develop a model that explains the existence of negative and positive forward 
premiums  as  well.  However,  their  work  has  a  different  focus.  They  incorporate  the 
changing relative eagerness of natural buyers and sellers to hedge their positions and test 
their model across different forward contract maturities. They validate their model by an 
empirical analysis showing that contracts closer to the delivery date (e.g. one month ahead) 
contain positive risk premiums that increase in the presence of spike risks on the German 
Forward Power Market. On the other hand, hedging pressure of natural sellers leads to 
negative premiums for forward contracts that mature in a relatively longer period of time 
(e.g. six months ahead). 
 
An  empirical  analysis  conducted  by  Longstaff  and  Wang  (2004)  largely  supported 
implications by the Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) equilibrium model in the case of 
                                                 
2 described more in depth in section 3 
3 for more details of power price properties see Weron et al (2004), Bierbrauer et al (2007) or Huisman et al 
(2007). 3 
 
the  Pennsylvania,  New  Jersey  and  Maryland  (PJM)  Wholesale  Market.  By  comparing 
hour-ahead  and  day-ahead  prices  for  each  hour,  Longstaff  and  Wang  found  positive 
premiums  for  hours  with  highest  demand  and  negative  premiums  for  hours  with  low 
consumption levels. Although the set of data available for the German Power Market is 
somewhat different, we use a similar methodology as Longstaff and Wang in this paper. 
Pirrong and Jermakyan (2008) also propose a model to capture risk premiums – or as they 
denote it, the market price of risk – for power derivatives. Their analysis also shows the 
presence of risk premiums at the PJM Market and the seasonality of these premiums. Other 
authors who recently published empirical analyses of electricity market premiums include 
Hadsell and Shawky (2007), Lucia and Torró (2008) and Redl et al (2009).  
 
Most research mentioned above focuses on the relation between mid to long-term futures 
(e.g week ahead, month ahead or year ahead) and spot prices (usually day-ahead). Solely 
Longstaff  and  Wang  (2004)  and  Hadsell  and  Shawky  (2007)  analyse  premiums  using 
hourly price data. This paper is the first article that presents an empirical analysis of hourly 
premiums in the German day-ahead Market. The timeframe between the settlement of the 
spot price and the forward price is less than two hours in our sample.  
 
The body of this article is as follows. Section 2 outlines the structure of the German Power 
Market and focuses particularly on the German Spot Market. Section 3 describes the set of 
data employed for the empirical analysis of premiums paid at the day-ahead market. In 
section 4,  tests  on  the  significance  of  these  risk  premiums  are  conducted.  Section 5 




2. The German Power Market 
The following section gives a short summary of the present state of the German Power 
Market and focuses in particular on the Spot Market, it’s most important features, market 
places  and  trading  participants.  Germany  represents  Europe’s  largest  Power  Market  in 
terms of consumption. The four largest electricity producers RWE, E.ON, Vattenfall and 
ENBW hold a market share between 70 and 85 percent
4. There are four high voltage grids 
operated  by  four  transmission  system  operators  (TSOs)  which  are  subsidiaries  of  the 
companies  mentioned  above.  These  380 kV  grids  also  represent  the  delivery  points  of 
power that is traded between market participants and on the Power Exchanges. Congestion 
between and within the grids is currently tackled exclusively by redispatch of the TSOs. 
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Other  practices  such  as  market  splitting  or  nodal  pricing
5  are  not  yet  in  focus.  This 
decrease in economic efficiency is accepted in order to benefit from one single, sufficiently 
large and actively traded market area. Today, the German Power Market is interconnected 
with a number of other European Power Markets of differing liquidity. Interaction between 
those markets requires transmission rights. Daily explicit day-ahead auctions are in place 
for  interconnector  transmission  capacities  to  and  from  Poland,  Czech  Republic, 
Switzerland,  France,  Netherlands,  Denmark  and  Sweden.  Most  of  these  countries  also 
feature liquid exchange-based day-ahead trading, some have actively traded OTC markets. 
Market coupling and implicit auctioning of interconnector capacities between the German 
Market and the Nordpool
6 region, namely Sweden and Denmark, should be established 
during 2009. 
 
The two main market places for day-ahead trading in Germany are represented by the 
exchange EEX and electronic OTC trading platforms. Due to its high liquidity, EEX is 
widely regarded as the benchmark and reference point of the German day-ahead Power 
Market. The annual day-ahead volume increased from 88.7 TWh in 2006 to 127.3 TWh in 
2007 and 154.5 TWh in 2008. Accordingly, daily spot trading volumes amounted to more 
than  one  quarter  of  the  overall  German  energy  demand  in  2008.  Like  other  Energy 
Exchanges  in  Europe,  EEX  facilitates  a  day-ahead  market  by  the  means  of  a  uniform 
pricing  auction
7.  On  the  day  prior  to  delivery,  price  dependent  and  price  independent 
hourly  bids  and  offers  can  be  submitted  to  the  electronic  EEX  platform  latest  12 p.m. 
Additionally, offers for individual power blocks consisting of at least two hours with the 
same quantity and price can be submitted. Prior to 12.15 p.m. and in accordance with the 
principle of the most executable volume, EEX clears all bids and offers and publishes 
hourly market clearing prices and volumes at 12.15 p.m. In contrast to Electricity Pool 
Systems like the PJM Market it is not mandatory for energy consumers, producers and 
traders  to  participate  in  auctions  at  the  exchange  based  system  EEX.  Liquidity  on  the 
Intraday  Market  which  covers  the  period  between  the  EEX  day-ahead  auction  and  the 
actual  delivery  period  on  the  next  day  is  only  fractional  compared  to  EEX  and  thus 
currently  not  suitable  to  conduct  further  research.  Real  time  imbalances  in  the  power 
system are balanced by generation units which can provide positive or negative primary, 
secondary and tertiary reserve energy. TSOs procure reserve energy on separate markets
8.  
 
In  contrast  to  exchanged  based  trading,  OTC  trades  take  places  directly  between  the 
counterparties and are often facilitated by broker companies. Transactions are executed via 
                                                 
5 See Brunekreeft et al (2005) for concepts of market splitting and nodal pricing  
6 Energy Exchange for the Scandinavian region 
7 See Ockenfels et al (2008) for more EEX auction details. 
8 For more details see Swider and Weber (2003) 5 
 
electronic broker platforms or bilaterally via telephone. Only standardised block contracts 
such as Base (delivery period h1-h24), Peak (h9-h20), Off-Peak (h1-h8, h21-h24), Night 
(h1-h6)  and  several  others  can  be  traded.  Most  day-ahead  trading  activities  take  place 
between 8 a.m. and 12 p.m. on the day prior to the delivery day. Thus, the continuous OTC 
market is important for market players to hedge larger volumes prior to the exchanged 
based auction at 12 p.m. The OTC-market can be considered to be the last forward market 
before  the  final  EEX  exchange  clears.  Although  trades  conducted  on  the  electronic 
platforms can be seen by all market participants who have access to these platforms, there 
is  to  our  knowledge  no  public  register  that  publishes  information  about  trading 
participants, trade prices or traded volumes on the OTC market. This certainly adds to the 
often criticised lack of transparency of OTC trading activities in comparison to exchange 
based trading. Therefore, the volumes traded on the day-ahead OTC market are difficult to 
quantify. However, the questioning of several market participants revealed that – in terms 
of volumes traded – exchange based and OTC based day ahead trading are in the same 
order of magnitude. 
 
A brief comparison between day-ahead EEX auction and day-ahead OTC prices for Base 
block contracts was published within the Energy Sector Inquiry by the European Union 
(2007).  The  report  states  that  “As  a  result  of  continuous  arbitrage,  prices  of  identical 
products  traded  on  different  marketplaces  (i.e.  on  power  exchanges  or  OTC  markets) 
develop in parallel. Indeed […], prices for day-ahead baseload delivery observed on the 
EEX  […]  and  the  German  OTC  market  are  very  closely  correlated  both  in  terms  of 
development and levels”. This conclusion is imprecise, particularly in relation to the day-
ahead  Power  Market.  Firstly,  continuous  arbitrage  is  not  possible  as  continuous  OTC 
trading takes place in the morning hours before the EEX auction. Hence, there is a time 
gap  between  the  two  marketplaces.  Secondly,  since  no  data  source  is  quoted  it  is  not 
specified which type of price is meant by OTC price. Since OTC-trading is continuous, 
there is not one single price that could be used as a reference OTC price. More information 
regarding  traded  volumes,  prices  and  a  comprehensive  overview  was  compiled  by 
Rademaekers et al (2008) on behalf of the European Commission. 
 
There is a whole range of trading participants in the European and German Power Markets 
who can be broadly divided into generators and retailers with inherent physical long or 
short positions and pure traders and banks who typically aim to exploit prices differences 
and  take  speculative  positions.  However,  the  Energy  Sector  Inquiry  by  the  European 
Commission (2007) states that large power producers are also engaged in speculative and 
arbitrage  trading.  Smaller  producers  and  retailers  on  the  other  hand  trade  mainly  to 
optimise their portfolios. Additionally, it is important to note that natural buyers do not 6 
 
necessarily buy and natural sellers do not necessarily sell on the day-ahead power market. 
Depending on their long-term procurement, hedging strategies and short term demand and 
supply variations, retailers might sell excess power and producers might repurchase power 
that was sold on future or forward markets in order to optimise their portfolios. Therefore, 
it is very likely that over time most market participants will appear on both sides of the 
market. 
 
In early 2009, more than 150 participants from 18 European countries and the U.S. were 
registered to trade on the EEX day-ahead Power Market. They include all the major power 
utilities  of  Central  Europe,  transmission  system  operators,  local  energy  companies  and 
municipalities as well as pure energy trading companies, several banks and others. Small 
companies  which  do  not  have  direct  access  to  the  EEX  trading  system  can  trade  via 
separate accounts of other trading members. To our knowledge there are no sources stating 
how many of these trading participants are also active on the OTC market. However, due 
to the function of the OTC market to hedge positions before the EEX auction, we assume 
that most participants with considerable volumes are engaged in the OTC market as well. 
At the Energy Exchange Austria (EXAA), which we use as a snapshot of the OTC market
9, 
about 50 participants from 13 countries were registered. Although this number seems to be 
small in comparison to EEX, all major energy utilities of Central Europe as well as several 




In order to facilitate a comparison of hourly EEX prices and OTC prices which are not 
publicly available, we decided to use prices provided by EXAA as a snapshot of the OTC 
market. EXAA is an Austrian based power exchange which conducts an hourly day-ahead 
auction between 10.12 a.m. and 10.15 a.m. for German (E.ON and RWE) and Austrian 
(APG) delivery points. As there have been no congestions reported so far, prices at these 
delivery points were always identical on EXAA for the Austrian and German market areas. 
Additionally, it is crucial to mention that EXAA prices coincide with continuous OTC 
prices at the time of the auction, otherwise arbitrage between the two market places was 
possible.  Hence,  EXAA  publicly  provides  a  set  of  data  that  reflects  the  OTC  market 
approximately 2 hours prior to the final EEX auction. The data sets we use consist of 
hourly  day-ahead  data  publicly  provided  by  the  EEX  and  EXAA  on  their  internet 
platforms.  They  cover  the  period  from  October  1,  2005
10  to  September  30,  2008. 
                                                 
9 See section 3 for more details 
10 The start date October 1, 2005 was chosen due to illiquid trading on EXAA in the first half of 2005 
resulting in missing price data.  7 
 
Accordingly, we work with a data set of 1096 days including a price for each of the 24 
hours for each delivery day. Prices are cleared on the day prior to the delivery day at 
10.15 a.m.  on  EXAA  and  12.15 p.m.  on  EEX.  As  there  has  been  no  trading  on  the 
weekends during the time period covered by our data, prices for delivery day Sunday and 
Monday were fixed on Fridays. The same principle holds for public holidays. 
 










































The average daily EEX price also known as Base contract is shown in Figure 1. The figure 
reveals two of the most apparent features of power prices: high volatility and price spikes. 
Table 1 and Table 2 list the hourly summary statistics for the EEX and EXAA respectively. 
Next to the mean, minimum, median and maximum price, the volatility and skewness for 
each hour is listed. The term h1 corresponds to the delivery period from 0-1 a.m. and so 
on. Additionally, the tables list summary statistics for five selected and frequently traded 
block products. A block product price consists of the average price of all hours it contains. 
All prices are quoted in €/MWh. Table 1 reveals several basic features  of the German 
Power Market. Firstly, mean prices in general follow the power demand curve. During 
night hours from h1-h6, power demand is at its lowest levels
11 with average prices at a 
range between 25 and 37 €/MWh. During the peak hours h9-h20 on the other hand, prices 
are on average more than twice as high. These higher prices are due to the fact that gas and 
oil fueled power stations produce at the margin most of the peak hours. These plants have 
higher variable generation costs than nuclear, lignite or coal fired power stations which 
generally produce at the margin during off-peak hours in the German system
12. 
 
All hourly maximum power prices for h10-h16 in table 1 originate from only two days in 
July 2006, a time when persistent high temperatures across Central Europe led to high 
power demand. Additionally, high river temperatures led to cooling water restrictions and 
                                                 
11 Compare to Figure 2 
12 A detailed analysis of the German power plant structure is given by Borchert et al (2006). 8 
 
reduced power output for a large number of power plants. The highest hourly maximum 
prices amounted to 2000.07 €/MWh for h12 on July 25, 2006 and 2436.63 €/MWh for h19 
on November 11,
 2006. Throughout this paper, we add alternative calculations excluding 
these two extreme price spikes, listed as 12a and 19a in table 1. The minimum price of 
several night and morning hours within the timeframe observed was zero. Even if there 
was more supply than demand at a price of zero, power prices could not turn negative on 
EEX as the minimum price is set to be zero. Instead, the principle of pro rata assignment 
was adopted to match all bids and offers. Pro rata assignment refers to a proportionate 




Next to mean prices, also standard deviation and skewness of power prices are low during 
off-peak hours (h1 – h8 and h21 – h24) compared to peak hours. The most volatile hours in 
our data set are summer peak (h9 to h16) and winter peak hours (h18, h19). They exhibit 
Table 1
Hour Mean Min Median Max Standard d. Skewness
h1 36.89 1.64 34.28 76.02 14.11 0.52
h2 32.03 0.00 29.95 71.07 13.46 0.45
h3 28.65 0.00 27.12 67.93 12.88 0.39
h4 25.73 0.00 23.98 69.52 12.55 0.39
h5 26.06 0.00 24.05 69.92 12.43 0.38
h6 31.61 0.00 30.29 70.28 13.82 0.23
h7 36.63 0.00 34.80 94.51 19.89 0.18
h8 53.11 0.00 51.14 301.01 30.72 1.25
h9 59.44 0.00 55.70 437.26 33.45 2.34
h10 64.60 0.00 59.84 499.68 36.47 3.16
h11 68.54 0.00 62.68 998.24 44.65 9.08
h12 77.05 5.56 68.01 2000.07 81.64 16.12
h12a** 75.29 5.56 68.00 1399.99 57.33 12.22
h13 67.08 6.96 63.03 699.81 37.94 6.44
h14 63.57 2.65 59.17 699.88 37.12 6.30
h15 59.98 0.07 55.04 800.09 37.83 7.75
h16 56.04 0.12 51.56 693.23 34.21 6.79
h17 54.70 3.86 50.14 300.01 29.60 2.27
h18 61.84 6.90 54.07 821.90 49.03 7.10
h19 67.54 15.95 59.11 2436.63 86.50 19.85
h19a*** 65.38 15.95 59.07 701.01 48.52 6.38
h20 60.00 17.97 57.06 250.04 27.75 1.78
h21 55.21 15.07 53.23 125.02 21.43 0.49
h22 48.61 13.48 46.31 105.93 17.92 0.49
h23 46.93 14.65 44.25 94.82 16.58 0.47
h24 38.23 1.61 35.28 80.98 14.22 0.58
Block period Mean Min Median Max Standard d. Skewness
h1-h24, Base 50.84 5.80 47.04 301.54 23.84 2.19
h9-h20, Peak 63.37 6.76 58.05 543.72 35.75 4.03
h1-h8, h21-h24**** 38.32 4.85 36.95 83.19 14.85 0.47
h1-h6, Night 30.16 0.27 28.25 69.72 12.66 0.44
h17-h20, Noon 61.02 15.24 54.60 674.76 39.99 5.91
* Data used with permission from EEX, European Energy Exchange.
*** excludes data from November 7th, 2006 (EEX h19: 2436.63 €/MWh) 
**** Off-Peak
Summary Statistics for Hourly and Block Day-Ahead EEX*-Prices
** excludes data from July 25th, 2006 (EEX h12: 2000.07 €/MWh)9 
 
standard deviations between 33.5 and 81.6 €/MWh. Standard deviations of h12 and h19 
even exceed the average prices of these hours. Not surprisingly, their distribution is also 
highly right-skewed. Skewness ranges from 2.3 to 19.9 €/MWh. Off-peak hours on the 
other  side  display  skewness  of  less  than  0.6 €/MWh  except  of  the  ramping  hour  h8. 
Positive skewness of power spot prices is attributable to the convex shape of the power 
supply curve and to the fact that power is non-storable. This phenomenon is a basic feature 
of power markets and was described by several authors, including for the German Power 
Market by Borchert et al (2006). 
 
However, seasonal changes in price patterns are not observable from table 1. While the 
highest prices during summertime are paid in h11-h13, prices peak in h18 and h19 during 
winter months. This originates from changing power demand patterns during the seasons 
as plotted in Figure 2. Demand peaks at noon during summer and in h18 and h19 during 
winter season, with absolute winter peak demand levels significantly higher than summer 
peaks. According to data provided by UCTE (2008), the 10 hours with the highest demand 
within the time period of our dataset can be found either in November or December, while 
lowest  demand  was  measured  in  May  and  June.  Additionally,  weekly  price  patterns 
featuring lower prices on weekends and price changes caused by varying fuel prices are not 




Figure 2: Power consumption in Germany on the third Wednesday in June and 
December 2007. Data provided by UCTE (2008)  
 
Table 2 lists the summary statistics of EXAA prices, representing the continuous OTC 
market approximately 2 hours prior to the final exchange EEX. Regarding price shape, 
intraday  variation  and  magnitude  of  mean  prices,  EXAA  and  EEX  show  very  similar 





































remarkable differences. Standard variation is higher on EEX in all peak hours except of 
h20. Skewness is also higher on EEX for all peak hours. Additionally, maximum prices 
during the peak hours are uniformly lower on EXAA except of h20. The highest EXAA 
prices within the time period covered by our data were 888.00 €/MWh in comparison to 
2000.07 €/MWh on EEX in h12 and 519.93 €/MWh in comparison to 2436.63 €/MWh in 
h19.  
 
These differences support the thesis that power prices are more volatile and display more 
extreme variations at EEX, which – except for the illiquid intraday trading market – is 
considered to be the last opportunity for traders to close positions. EXAA and the OTC 
market, on the other hand, can be considered to be the last forward markets prior to EEX 
and thus they are less volatile and show less extreme variations. A dataset of the PJM 
Market comparing day-ahead and hour-ahead prices used by Longstaff and Wang (2004) 
displays very similar properties.  
 
 
   
Table 2
Summary Statistics for Hourly Day-Ahead EXAA*-Prices
Hour Mean Min Median Max Standard d. Skewness
h1 36.97 6.83 35.00 81.00 13.38 0.51
h2 31.64 0.55 29.81 68.53 12.46 0.54
h3 28.17 0.01 26.40 65.64 11.84 0.53
h4 25.57 0.01 23.59 75.00 11.49 0.63
h5 26.00 0.01 24.15 62.50 11.56 0.53
h6 31.19 0.01 30.21 70.30 13.24 0.27
h7 37.14 0.01 36.58 92.06 18.62 0.21
h8 53.92 0.01 51.14 208.21 29.03 0.80
h9 59.81 0.01 57.53 205.00 29.52 0.82
h10 65.18 11.00 61.67 376.93 33.25 2.21
h11 69.26 11.67 65.00 459.46 35.88 2.82
h12 76.28 0.07 69.85 888.00 49.48 6.94
h13 67.63 20.60 63.97 458.89 33.86 3.78
h14 63.99 17.00 60.95 409.65 31.87 2.75
h15 60.16 3.51 57.07 350.00 30.85 2.41
h16 57.02 11.27 54.05 300.00 28.87 1.88
h17 56.65 9.83 52.06 240.00 28.97 1.49
h18 65.36 12.68 55.59 517.55 47.92 4.09
h19 68.31 17.60 60.00 519.93 46.63 3.87
h20 61.87 20.00 59.00 302.37 28.95 1.72
h21 55.78 19.40 54.94 127.78 20.69 0.49
h22 49.15 9.99 47.00 100.57 17.02 0.44
h23 48.10 1.00 45.73 90.00 16.47 0.36
h24 39.48 1.00 37.71 84.27 14.28 0.48
Block period Mean Min Median Max Standard d. Skewness
h1-h24, Base 51.44 13.60 48.40 177.85 22.32 1.15
h9-h20, Peak 64.29 17.26 60.25 299.99 32.03 1.89
h1-h8, h21-h24** 38.59 8.14 37.18 80.50 14.46 0.46
h1-h6, Night 29.92 1.40 28.25 66.25 11.95 0.50
h17-h20, Noon 63.05 16.52 56.52 370.41 36.47 2.81
**Off-Peak
* Data used with permission from EXAA, Energy Exchange Austria. 11 
 
4. Risk Premiums 
As  mentioned  in  section 1,  standard  cost-of-carry  approaches  cannot  be  applied  to 
determine  forward  premiums  in  electricity  markets  due  to  the  fact  that  power  is  non-
storable in meaningful quantities at competitive cost. Hence, in equilibrium models the 
“forward premium represents the equilibrium compensation for bearing the price and/or 
demand risk for the underlying commodity. […]. Forward premia should be fundamentally 
related to economic risk and the willingness of different market participants to bear these 
risks.” (Longstaff and Wang, 2004). We define the risk premium
13 RPi,t as the difference 
between the expected spot price and the forward price for each hour i.  
 
[ ] 1 , , , + - = t i t t i t i S E F RP              (1) 
 
where Fi,t is the forward price and Et[Si,t+t] the conditional expectation of the spot price. 
The expectation is conditional to all information available at time t. Analysing realised risk 
premiums  rather  than  modelling  expected  spot  prices  requires  some  additional 
assumptions. We denote the difference between the expected and the realised spot price as 
forecast error which can also be written as random noise εi,t+t (equation 2). In the course of 
this paper, we assume that the forecast error εi,t+t has a mean of zero and is independent of 
information available at time t.  
 
[ ] 1 , 1 , 1 , + + + - = t i t i t t i S S E e             (2) 
 
We define EEX as the spot market and EXAA reflecting the OTC market before the EEX 
as forward market using the data presented in the previous section. Hence, the timeframe 
between t and t+1 is only two hours. Thus, RPi is on average positive if the price at the 
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Risk premiums of block contracts are computed in the same way. We use t-statistics to 
ascertain not only whether the premiums observed are positive or negative, but also to test 
whether the null-hypothesis that RPi is zero can be rejected or not. Autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity consistent estimates of the variances were used for all t-statistics.  
 
 
                                                 
13 As both terms forward premium and risk premium are used in literature to describe the same concept, we 
use these terms interchangeable. 12 
 
Table 3 and Figure 3 summarise the mean hourly risk premiums paid in the German day-
ahead Power Market for all 1096 days of the dataset. The overall mean of the premium 
represented  by  the  Base  block  contract  is  positive  (0.61 €/MWh),  but  not  statistically 
different  from  zero.  However,  premiums  observed  are  statistically  significant  at  the 
5 percent  level  for  5  of  the  24  hourly  contracts.  Significant  positive  premiums  can  be 
observed exclusively for evening hours. Three of the four hours with the highest demand 
levels  in  winter  h17-h20
14  were  traded  with  positive  premiums  that  are  significantly 
different  from  zero  at  the  5 percent  level.  The  highest  premium  were  paid  in  h18 
(3.52 €/MWh)  and  h17  (1.95 €/MWh),  In  terms  of  the  average  EEX  price  in  h18,  the 
premium accounts for a percentage premium of 5.9 percent. Additionally, the frequently 
traded block h17-h20 displays a positive premium of 2.03 €/MWh, statistically significant 





                                                 
14 compare to figure 2 
Table 3
Hour Mean t-statistic p-value Mean t-statistic p-value Mean t-statistic p-value
h1 0.08 0.28 0.780 0.42 1.24 0.214 -0.74 -1.47 0.143
h2 -0.39 -1.36 0.174 -0.13 -0.50 0.617 -1.04 -1.74 0.083
h3 -0.48 -1.49 0.136 -0.09 -0.30 0.763 -1.46 -2.41 0.017
h4 -0.16 -0.39 0.698 0.37 0.79 0.427 -1.49 -2.18 0.030
h5 -0.07 -0.19 0.853 0.32 0.84 0.401 -1.02 -1.60 0.110
h6 -0.42 -1.15 0.253 -0.21 -0.58 0.564 -0.94 -1.48 0.139
h7 0.52 1.04 0.300 0.09 0.15 0.879 1.58 1.73 0.084
h8 0.81 0.88 0.378 0.24 0.21 0.832 2.22 3.04 0.003
h9 0.36 0.41 0.679 0.17 0.15 0.881 0.86 1.51 0.133
h10 0.58 0.60 0.546 0.61 0.53 0.593 0.50 0.73 0.467
h11 0.72 0.67 0.502 0.81 0.53 0.597 0.50 0.68 0.494
h12 -0.77 -0.22 0.829 -1.27 -0.26 0.797 0.47 0.54 0.589
h12a* 0.72 0.85 0.409 0.82 0.73 0.468
h13 0.55 0.56 0.573 0.83 0.62 0.537 -0.16 -0.26 0.798
h14 0.42 0.42 0.675 0.35 0.26 0.793 0.59 0.99 0.321
h15 0.17 0.15 0.885 0.00 0.00 0.998 0.62 1.47 0.142
h16 0.97 0.97 0.332 0.93 0.71 0.481 1.07 2.07 0.039
h17 1.95 1.98 0.048 2.29 1.66 0.097 1.10 1.98 0.049
h18 3.52 2.61 0.009 4.49 2.15 0.032 1.10 1.17 0.242
h19 0.77 0.18 0.858 0.90 0.15 0.877 0.46 0.55 0.586
h19a** 2.88 1.55 0.122 3.86 1.25 0.212
h20 1.87 3.26 0.001 2.68 3.79 0.000 -0.14 -0.18 0.861
h21 0.58 1.15 0.249 0.32 0.60 0.549 1.20 1.42 0.158
h22 0.53 1.14 0.255 0.42 0.84 0.401 0.82 1.21 0.227
h23 1.17 2.14 0.033 1.29 2.58 0.010 0.86 1.12 0.262
h24 1.25 2.59 0.010 1.27 2.63 0.001 1.21 1.70 0.091
Block period Mean t-statistic p-value Mean t-statistic p-value Mean t-statistic p-value
h1-h24, Base 0.61 1.27 0.203 0.71 1.41 0.254 0.34 1.30 0.164
h9-h20, Peak 0.93 1.12 0.263 1.07 0.96 0.337 0.58 1.23 0.220
h1-h8, h21-h24*** 0.27 1.04 0.297 0.36 1.26 0.210 0.06 0.22 0.829
h1-h6, Night -0.24 -0.92 0.359 0.11 0.44 0.662 -1.11 -2.31 0.022
h17-h20, Evening 2.03 1.75 0.080 2.59 1.55 0.122 0.63 1.04 0.299
* excludes data from July 25th, 2006 (EEX: 2000.07 €/MWh, EXAA: 364.92 €/MWh)
** excludes data from November 7th, 2006 (EEX: 2436.63 €/MWh, EXAA: 126.48 €/MWh)
*** Off-Peak
t-statistics are based on autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity consistent estimates of the variances
Weedays Weekends
Tests for the Presence of Risk Premiums in the German Power Spot Market
All Days13 
 
Additionally, we analyse subsets of the data in order to obtain a more detailed pattern of 
time  and  seasonal  variations  of  the  risk  premiums  observed.  As  shown  in  table 3,  the 
subsets “weekdays” (782 sample days) and “weekend days” (314 sample days) are drawn 
from  the  overall  sample.  Their  comparison  reveals  some  remarkable  differences.  First, 
positive risk premiums for the evening peak hours are much smaller on weekend days. By 
contrast,  the  same  hours  during  weekdays  display  risk  premiums  that  are  significantly 
different from zero. The highest positive premiums were paid in h18 (4.49 €/MWh) and 
h20 (2.68 €/MWh). In terms of the average EEX prices on weekdays, the positive premium 
paid on EXAA accounts for a percentage premium of 6.4 percent in h18 and 4.1 percent in 
h20.  The  comparison  of  the  night  hours  h1-h6  uncovers  additional  information  about 
varying premiums. While risk premiums are close to zero and not statistically significant 
on  weekdays,  they  are  negative  on  weekend  days.  Risk  premiums  are  negative  at  a 
10 percent confidence level for three of the six night hours. The highest negative premiums 
were paid in h3 (-1.46 €/MWh) and h4 (-1.49 €/MWh). In terms of the average EEX prices 
on weekend days, the negative premium accounts for a percentage premium of -5.2 percent 
in h3 and -6.0 percent for h4. Also the frequently traded night block h1-h6 displays a 
negative  premium  (-1.11 €/MWh)  on  weekend  days,  statistically  significant  at  the 




Next, the dataset was further divided into summer and winter month in order to look for 
seasonal  variations  of  the  risk  premiums.  We  define  May  to  August  as  summer  (369 
sample days) and November to February as winter month (361 sample days). As shown in 
table 4, we focus on the evening peak hours that displayed positive risk premiums in the 
overall sample. Additionally, h17-h20 represent the hours with highest power demand in 
the winter season, whereas the same hours are not as crucial during summer months
15. 
Comparing all summer and all winter days reveals clear differences in the premiums paid. 
The average risk premium of the four hours is more than eight times higher during winter 
                                                 
15 Compare to Figure 2 
Table 4
Tests for Time Variation of Risk Premiums during Winter and Summer
Hour Mean t-statistic p-value Mean t-statistic p-value Mean t-statistic p-value
h17 May - Aug -0.15 -0.07 0.942
h18 May - Aug 0.65 1.04 0.301
h19 May - Aug 0.47 0.85 0.394
h20 May - Aug 0.95 1.58 0.114
h17 Nov - Feb 4.66 2.80 0.005 5.83 2.51 0.013 1.69 1.27 0.208
h18 Nov - Feb 7.46 1.48 0.141 9.96 1.83 0.069 1.12 0.56 0.580
h19 Nov - Feb 0.11 0.01 0.004 -0.20 -0.01 0.991 0.88 0.60 0.553
h19a* Nov - Feb 6.52 1.26 0.208 8.75 1.08 0.280
h20 Nov - Feb 4.27 3.23 0.001 5.68 3.96 0.000 0.69 0.39 0.696
* excludes data from November 7th, 2006 (EEX: 2436.63 €/MWh, EXAA: 126.48 €/MWh)
Weedays Weekends
t-statistics are based on autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity consistent estimates of the variances
All Days14 
 
months in comparison to summer months. Premiums in summer month are all smaller than 
1 €/MWh  and  none  is  statistically  significant.  Interestingly  though,  merely  the  risk 
premiums for h17 (4.66 €/MWh) and h20 (4.27 €/MWh) are statistically significant at a 
5 percent  level  during  winter  time.  Although  h18  and  h19a  display  even  larger  mean 
premiums, they are not significant due to their large autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity 
consistent estimated volatilities. As shown in table 4, this changes if one further divides the 
winter days into weekdays (259 sample days) and weekend days (102 sample days). Again, 
risk premiums are higher on weekdays than on weekend days. Additionally, premiums are 
statistically significant at a 10 percent level for three of the four hours on weekdays, but for 
none of the hours on weekend days. Apart from h19a, the highest premiums were paid in 
h17  (5.83 €/MWh)  and  h18  (9.96 €/MWh)  during  the  winter  period.  In  terms  of  the 
average EEX prices for h17 and h18 on winter weekdays, these premiums account for 




The  results  obtained  in  section 4  are  consistent  with  the  equilibrium  model  for  power 
markets developed by Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) and the empirical analysis of 
PJM market prices undertaken by Longstaff and Wang (2004). The model developed by 
Bessembinder and Lemmon associates the variance and skewness of the underlying power 
prices to the premiums paid in the forward market. As mentioned above, the convex power 
supply  curve  leads  to  right  skewed  power  prices,  particularly  in  peak  hours  with  the 
highest demand. Thus, buyers face the risk of considerable losses if they need to cover a 
short position during the presence of positive spikes. The fact that the prices of two hours 
during the timeframe observed were above 2000 €/MWh clearly demonstrates that the risk 
of price spikes is real. In a similar fashion to Benth et al (2008) one can use the term 
“sellers  market”  to  explain  the  presence  of  positive  risk  premiums  for  hours  with  the 
highest demand. Our data confirm that power traders are willing to pay large premiums of 
up to 10 percent for the evening peak hours h17-h20 on weekdays during winter months. 
These hours feature the highest demand levels of the year and price spikes often occur. 
However, traders are not willing to pay risk premiums for the same hours on weekends or 
during summer season when demand is much lower. Seasonality of risk premiums was also 
shown  by  Pirrong  and  Jermakyan  (2008)  and  Lucia  and  Torró  (2008).  According  to 
Pirrong and Jermakyan (2008), forward premiums on the PJM Market peaked for daily 
deliveries in July and August which feature the highest consumption levels of the year. On 
the other side, they found that forward prices are downward biased in shoulder months 
with relatively low demand. Lucia and Torró (2008) found time-varying risk premiums for 
the  Nordpool  region.  Premiums  were  largest  during  autumn  and  winter,  the  time  with 15 
 
highest demand and lowest hydro reservoir levels in Scandinavia. 
 
The data confirm that power traders behave risk-aversely and rationally and are willing to 
pay significant risk premiums in the presence of risk factors. This is rational, as the right 
skewness of power prices can lead to substantial losses for those who hold short power 
forward positions. Pirrong and Jermakyan (2008) denote this as left skewness of the profit 
distribution for those who are short. They describe the case of a large utility in the U.S. 
whose entire year’s earnings were wiped out on one single day due to a short position. 
Cases  of  corporate  default  and  near  bankruptcy  due  to  power  price  spikes  were  also 
reported by Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002). Hence, it is well understood that there is a 
demand for risk reduction and companies profit from reducing risk of their cash flows and 
variability of returns by hedging their positions. 
 
On the other side, there is only little skewness during off-peak hours, particularly from h1 
to h6 when demand is at its lowest level. Hence, Bessembinder and Lemmon argue that 
sellers who want to hedge their revenues induce a downward bias in equilibrium forward 
prices.  The  absence  of  buying  interest  during  hours  of  lowest  consumption  leads  to  a 
“buyers  market”  with  negative  risk  premiums.  Our  findings  confirm  this  theory. 
Statistically significant negative premiums of up to -6 percent were paid for several night 
hours and the night block h1-h6 on weekend days. These periods of time coincide with the 
lowest load levels of each week. 
 
However, it is not feasible to compare the order of magnitude of the premiums observed in 
the German and the PJM Market. This is due to the different type of data sets that were 
used. While we compare two different types of hourly day-ahead prices, Longstaff and 
Wang (2004) use a set of day-ahead and hour-ahead data. Nevertheless, positive as well as 
negative risk premiums for some individual hours seem to be large in comparison to other 
studies as the timeframe between the forward and the spot market is less than two hours. 
As shown by Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) and Hadsell and Shawky (2007), the 
existence of large premiums could be an indication that the German Power Spot Market is 
not yet fully integrated into the wider financial market, despite the fact that several pure 
trading companies and investment banks are active in it. 
 
 
6. Conclusion and Discussion 
This paper presents an empirical analysis of risk premiums paid in the German day-ahead 
Power Market. The overall mean of the risk premium is positive (0.61 €/MWh), but not 
statistically  different  from  zero.  However,  we  find  negative  as  well  as  positive  risk 16 
 
premiums  that  are  significantly  different  from  zero  for  hourly  delivery  contracts.  The 
largest  positive  premium  of  on  average  9.96 €/MWh  (10.2 percent)  was  paid  for  the 
evening  peak  hour  h18  on  weekdays  during  winter,  the  time  with  the  highest  power 
consumption levels of the year. Our results are consistent with equilibrium forward pricing 
models and empirical results by Lemmon and Bessembinder (2002), Longstaff and Wang 
(2004) and Pirrong and Jermakyan (2008) for the PJM Market and confirm that energy 
traders  behave  rationally  like  risk  averse-agents.  Their  willingness  to  pay  positive  risk 
premiums is directly related to the presence of price spikes in spot power markets which 
can lead to substantial losses to those who hold physical short positions that need to be 
covered. 
 
Negative  premiums  of  up  to  -1.49 €/MWh  (-6.0 percent)  were  paid  for  night  hours  on 
weekends,  the  time  with  lowest  energy  demand  levels.  This  is  also  consistent  with 
Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) who argue that hedging pressure of producers in off-
peak hours can lead to a downward bias of forward prices. It remains to be seen how the 
introduction of negative prices will affect negative risk premiums of weekend night hours 
in the future. From September 2008 EEX reduced the price floor, negative prices of up to -
3,000 €/MWh  are  now  possible.  Negative  prices  might  result  in  a  left-skewed  price 
distribution and larger negative premiums for the hours affected. In December 2008, the 
day-ahead EEX price was less than -100 €/MWh for three consecutive hours. 
 
Our dataset covers a period of only three years which does not allow for an analysis of how 
the entrance of new market participants affected the market. Hence, we are not looking into 
whether systematic changes in risk premiums have occurred over time. As trading volumes 
increased  and  neutral  pure  trading  companies  and  banks  started  in  the  power  trading 
businesses during recent years, one would expect risk premiums to decrease over time
16. 
 
We  explicitly  do  not  analyse  whether  risk  premiums  are  paid  on  the  EEX  day-ahead 
Market in comparison to the Intraday Market which covers the time frame between the 
day-ahead auction and the actual delivery period. This could be an interesting subject for 
further research as soon as market liquidity improves and data problems are solved. Unlike 
Daskalakis  and  Markellos  (2009),  we  argue  that  the  EEX  intraday  data  are  not  of 
satisfactory quality to conduct further research on risk premiums for several reasons. First, 
since intraday trading has started in September 2006, there have been no intraday trades 
reported in 45 percent of the hours in 2006, 19 percent of all hours in 2007 and 3 percent of 
all hours in 2008 resulting in missing price data. Secondly, the estimated figure of hours 
                                                 
16 See Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) and Hadsell and Shawky (2007) 17 
 
with only one trade is in the same order of magnitude in each year
17. Additionally, it is 
hardly feasible to compare the prices of the EEX day-ahead Auction with prices of the 
continuous EEX Intraday Market. EEX publishes the minimum, maximum, average and 
last intraday price of each hour. As it is not know at what specific time intraday trades take 
place  and  the  trading  period  can  be  longer  than  24  hours,  the  determination  and 
comparison of risk premiums between the day-ahead auction and the continuous intraday 
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